Niger: the struggle for the real independence

While the Russo-Ukrainian War seems to be descending into an interminable and protracted war, the military coup in the Republic of Niger, a former French colony in West Africa, which resulted in President Mohamed Bazoum being detained by his guards and placed under house arrest as well as the occupation of state television by Niger soldiers to declare the overt military victory, has recently drawn attention to the African continent, which has previously received relatively little exposure. At the same time, France took a strong stand against the coup, with President Macron declaring that he would defend French interests in the Niger and ECOWAS threatening military intervention in the Niger. While Mali, Burkina Faso and Algeria, have proclaimed their support for the coup and declared that any external military intervention in Niger would be tantamount to a threat to them, the situation has appeared to be spiraling out of control for a time. This coup, which took place in the region of the world where coups occur most frequently, appears to be just another struggle for power, but it is actually a revolution and a fight against France’s neo-colonialist tactics.

The military coup in Niger in July was not an isolated incident; in fact, it was the eleventh coup to take place in the Sahel region—also known as the “coup belt”—since 2020. Actually,more coups have occurred in French-speaking nations than in English-speaking ones in West Africa and the Sahel region,since 1990, accounting for 78% of the region’s 27 coups. This raises the question of what France brought to these former colonies that has led to the current situation. The French presence in Africa has a long history. As early as the 17th century, the First French Colonial Empire established its first trading post in Senegal in West Africa, and in the following 18th and 19th centuries, the French colonial empire’s territory in Africa was dramatically exaggerated, occupying a large amount of land in North Africa, West Africa and Central Africa, making it the largest occupier of colonial territory in Africa. In the aftermath of World War II, many of France’s African colonies achieved independence during the decolonization movement and wave of national independence. At first glance, it looked that France had lost many of its colonies, and many Africans rejoiced in their countries’ newly found freedom. True independence, though, remained elusive. Through a variety of tactics, France continued to impose control over Africa, creating the special and intricate “Françafrique” relationship.

Ⅰ. Resource looting

The French resource plundering of West Africa today is focused on the robbery of natural resources, such as natural uranium, as opposed to the colonial-era pillage of Africa’s demographic resources. As the world’s second-largest producer of nuclear power, France relies on nuclear energy for 70.6% of its electricity production. To maintain its nuclear power plants, France requires approximately 8,000 tons of natural uranium annually. Additionally, as one of the few nuclear-armed nations, uranium resources also hold significant military significance for the French military. Therefore, natural uranium plays an indispensable role in both France’s civilian and military nuclear sectors. Niger, which produces 4.7% of the world’s natural uranium, comes in third place behind Kazakhstan and Australia in 2021. In 2022, Niger produced fuel for over 103 nuclear reactors in 13 EU Member States, making it the second-largest natural uranium supplier to the EU. At the same time, Niger is the third largest natural uranium supplier to France between 2005 and 2020, meeting 19% of its demand for 56 nuclear reactors and 18 nuclear power plants. Despite having made a substantial contribution to France’s nuclear energy development, Niger receives little in return, with 85% of the country’s people still lacking access to electricity, and only 12% of the proceeds from uranium exports going back to Niger. Additionally, the uranium mining industry in Niger generates sizable profits for Orano, the French nuclear energy group that is more than 90% state-owned, which owns more than 59% of three mines in the north of the nation: The Aïr mines, The Akokan mining site, and the Imouraren mine. According to a 2013 report by Oxfam, Niger gave the French organization Orano around 30% of the uranium it required, but Orano only paid Niger 7% of the total. Through negotiations with the Niger government, the corporation also obtained tax breaks worth tens of millions of euros. According to estimates, France, the main purchaser of natural uranium from Niger, purchases the uranium annually for an amount that is significantly less than market value — equal to 0.8 €/kg—while purchasing natural uranium from Canada for an amount that is comparable to 200 €/kg. As one of the world’s least developed countries and one of the poorest, with nearly 60% of its population living on less than 1$ a day, Niger is ranked at the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index, and the plundering of natural uranium, the Niger’s main export, by France, has exacerbated the economic situation of this poorest of countries.

Figure 1. Share of uranium delivered to EU utilities in 2022, by origin country (in %). Euratom Supply Agency (2022)

Figure 2. Natural uranium imported into France from 2012-2022. Technical Committee Euratom

II. Financial control

In addition to the plundering of Niger’s uranium resources, France’s economic plundering of Niger is also reflected in its fiscal and monetary policies. Niger, together with other seven West African countries comprise the West African Economic and Monetary Union(UEMOA), use the CFA franc as its currency, which is pegged to the euro at a fixed exchange rate set by France, and being guaranteed by the French government. However, the French Ministry of Finance controls the issuance and printing of the CFA franc, the nations that use the currency pay a mint tax to France, 50% of the UEMOA’s foreign exchange reserves must be held at the French central bank, and there is a sizable French presence on the central bank boards of West African nations. Therefore, despite appearing to be jointly managed by France and the central banks of West African nations, the West African franc’s monetary system is in fact under France’s de facto authority. UEMOA lacks monetary autonomy and the authority to issue additional currency, which makes it difficult for the governments to make loans and causes the economy to expand slowly. In addition, the countries has no control over the price of its currency and is unable to use the exchange rate to control the currency in the case of a financial crisis. Despite the obvious drawbacks, what is worse is that it seems difficult for these countries to move away from this currency. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which consists of 15 countries in West Africa (including UEMOA), announced plans to introduce the ECO currency in 2020. However, due to the epidemic and other circumstances, in 2021, ECOWAS member states decided at a summit that the ECO currency would not be introduced until 2027. Some economists have analyzed that one of the major influencing factors is the failure of the economic situation of the member countries to meet the convergence criteria. According to Macroeconomic Convergence Criteria Adopted By The Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Governments in 2015, member states are required to fulfill the following criteria to ensure macroeconomic stability when the single currency is issued.

Primary Criteria

(1)Ration of Budget deficit (commitment basis, including grants) to GDP: lower than or equal to 3% of GDP.

(2)Average annual inflation rate: less than 10% in short term ad 5% as from 31st December 2019.

(3)Central Bank financing of Budget Deficit: less than or equal to 10% of previous year’s tax revenue.

(4)Gross external reserves: greater than or equal to three months of imports cover.

Secondary Criteria

(1)Nominal exchange rate variation: (+/- 10%).

(2)Public debt to GDP ratio: less than or equal to 70%.

But unfortunately, until 2017, the ECOWAS member states did not reach the mentioned criteria. It is worth to note that the adoption of the CFA franc by West African nations decreases the risk of inflation, avoids significant exchange rate swings, and is objectively favorable to the stability of the region’s economies and currencies. From the standpoint of global trade, the peg between the CFA franc and the Euro can ensure merchants’ faith in this currency, which promotes international trade and commercial cooperation. If ECOWAS members use the single currency ECO, which is not pegged to the euro, how will the ECO safeguard exchange rate stability, secure traders’ confidence in this new currency, and win international backing? All of these are worthwhile issues to consider. In addition to these difficulties, France’s opposition to UEMOA member states participating in the ECO currency may be another reason why the single currency may not be introduced in 2020. According to economist Séraphin Prao, the execution of this project was somewhat hampered by Macron’s trip to Côte d’Ivoire in 2019.

Figure 3. Number of Countries that Met the Covergence Criteria in ECOWAS. WEST AFRICAN MONETARY AGENCY (2017)

III. Military presence

The French military presence on the African continent has a long history, as many French soldiers came to the continent during the colonial era to fight for the motherland and to open up colonies. Today, the Sahel region, which is plagued by extreme poverty, backwardness, and regional conflicts, is a breeding ground for terrorism. France started military operations in 2012 and 2014 with the names “Operation Serval” and “Operation Barkhane” to combat terrorism. Armed forces were sent to the Sahel region to cooperate with the G5 Sahel in the fight against terrorism. Nevertheless, after years of counterterrorism operations, the French military has not made much headway, and if anything, the threat of terrorism has grown. Significant criticism has also been leveled at these efforts. The Minister of State of Burkina Faso, Bassolma Bazie, in his recent speech to the United Nations General Assembly, had suspected that the terrorist forces in the Sahel region were being financed by external forces such as France and the United States, and had continued to maintain a military presence in the region on the pretext of counterterrorism. However, as anti-French sentiment rises and the people of West Africa’s desire for true independence and freedom increase, France has experienced significant defeats in the Sahel region in recent years. France left Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic between 2022 and early 2023 as a result of anti-French regimes taking control in the Sahel countries and widespread protests. And on 24 September, two months after the military coup in Niger, French President Macron announced that he would recall his ambassador in Niger and withdraw the 1,500 French troops in Niger to their homeland before the end of the year. As a result, only 1,000 French troops in Chad remain in the Sahel. But the withdrawal of French troops did not mean the complete disappearance of French military forces in Africa, in this continent, France still has five military bases, a total of 3,820 military combatants, and a small number of troops to participate in the European Union’s operations in Africa and the United Nations peacekeeping missions. The presence of French troops on the African continent not only allows France to protect its expatriates, but also gives it the ability to intervene at any time and in any place to defend its interests there and allows it to maintain its political and economic influence there. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly, Bassolma Bazie also stated that one of the primary causes of the high number of coups on the continent is the influence of certain nations and organizations that plunder resources, promote poor governance, and cultivate proxies in Africa, resulting in corrupt and ineffective governments and the suffering of the people. He added that “Coups are just a result, and if we eradicate the causes, so will the results diminish.”

Figure 4. French military presence in Africa until 25 September 2023. French Ministry of Defence (2023)

Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso signed a charter in the Malian city of Bamako shortly after the military coup d’état in Niger. The charter established a defense alliance and decided to form the Alliance of Sahel States with the goals of battling terrorism, organized crime, and common defense. This resulted in the formation of a “coalition against France” in West Africa as well as the dissolution of the G5 Sahel, which had been established in 2014. With the withdrawal of French troops and the sharp decline of French influence in the region, there is every indication that the region has come under the influence of the Russian Wagner Group, which seems to be behind the military coups in all three countries of the Alliance of Sahel States. Against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the destruction of the Nord Stream, and the impending winter, the questions of whether the fall of the pro-French government in Niger, a major exporter of natural uranium, will have an impact on the winter energy supply of France and the EU, and whether this is a retaliation or a strategic arrangement by Russia, are worthy of in-depth consideration. It is also unfortunate for Africa that other external forces have entered at a time when it is uncertain whether France can be driven out of Africa. How Niger, West Africa, and the African continent can escape the fate of being enslaved by the great Powers and interfered with by external forces and achieve real development is something that African leaders need to work hard to achieve. Burkina Faso leader Ibrahim Traoré said at the recent 2nd Russia-Africa Summit,” Slaves who dare not resist, their fate is not worthy of sympathy.”

Zhanchong (Simon) WU is a research assistant at APRDIHK.